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In Bank.

[39 C.2d

July 9, 1952.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN W. EVANS, JR.,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attomey.-Misconduct of prosecuting
attorney in asking leading questions without making any
attempt to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein
and apparently for the purpose of getting uncorroborated
testimony before the jury is a possible ground for reversal,
although objections were not made to all of such questions,
where the case is one in which an admonition would not have
purged the harmful effect of the remarks.
[2] Indictment and Information-Charging Offense-Conformity
to Preliminary Proceedings.-In view of the rule that an
information may charge a different but related crime shown
by the evidence taken before the magistrate bearing on the
·transaction involved in the commitment order, an information
charging lewd conduct with a child in violation of Pen.
Code, § 288, as to which a commitment was ordered, may include the related offense of sex perversion in violation of
Pen. Code, § 288a, although defendant was not bound over
by the committing magistrate on•that charge.
[3] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-Any confusion or prejudice resulting from an
awkwardly drawn instruction that "defendant in a criminal
case is not required to prove his innocence, but is presumed
to be innocent until the contrary is proven, and in case of '
a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to an acquittal, and if the evidence can reasonably be accounted for upon a theory which would admit of
a defendant's innocence, he should not be convicted," may
not be ground for reversal where a further instruction states
that "the effect of a presumption of innocence is only to place
upon the State the burden of proving a defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt," ap.d where this is followed
by the orthodox instruction on the meaning of "reasonable
doubt."
[4] !d.-New Trial-Misconduct of Jury-Affidavits of Jurors.Affidavits of jurors are inadmissible for purpose of impeach[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Low, § 458; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 70.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6] Criminal Law, § 1404(8); [2] Indictment and Information, § 62; [3] Criminal Law, § 1419(8);
[4] Criminal Law, § 961 (3); [5] Criminal Law, §§ 1404(1), (8);
[7) Criminal Law,§ 1404(12).
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ing verdict whether they show misconduct or evidence received
out of court.
[5a-5c] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.-Where the case is one involving a crime of such inflammatory character as lewd conduct
with a child and the only evidence as to identity of assailant
is the child's testimony which, while not so inherently impl·obable as to be worthy of no belief, describes her assailant
with such exactitude as to raise a doubt whether or not she
had been coached in her lines, improper and repetitious
questions by the prosecuting attorney setting forth defendant's
exact description, statements of police officers describing
the crime put in the form of questions to defendant in an
attempt to gain from him an admission, reference by prosecuting attorney to a knife found on defendant's person but not
'introduced in evidence, and other errors which helped tip
the scales against defendant, constitute grounds for a reversal.
[6] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney.-Repeated asking of questions relative
to objectionable and prejudicial matter which involves appeals
to the passions and prejudices of the jury constitutes reversible error.
[7] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney.-Statements of fact not in evidence
by the prosecution in its argument to the jury constitute prejudicial misconduct.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Alameda
County denying a new trial. Charles Wade Snook, Judge.
Reversed.
Prosecution for lewd conduct with a child. Order denying
defendant a new trial, reversed.
Popper & Burnstein, Fred B. Hart and Robert H. Kroninger for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and David K. Lener, Deputy
Atto~ney General, for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendant, John W. Evans, Jr., was convicted of a violation of section 288 of the Penal Code, and
also of a violation of section 288a of the same code. The
court granted a new trial on the 288a count, but denied de-
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fendant 's motion for a new trial on the 288 violation. A
third count, charging assault with a deadly weapon was dismissed prior to trial. Judgment was suspended and defendant was placed on probation on the condition that he serve
a nine months' sentence in the county jail. After hearing,
it was determined that the defendant was not a sexual psychopath. The appeal is from the order denying a new trial
on the conviction under section 288 of the Penal Code.
The principal contentions raised on this appeal are the
insufficiency of the evidence so far as the element of identification is concerned and prejudicial errors alleged to have occurred during the course of the trial.
It clearly appears from the record that the complaining
witness, a female child of 10% years, was accosted and
molested in an Oakland public park about 6 p. m. on a Saturday evening (.August 12, 1950) as she was leaving a swimming pool located there on her way home. .According to
her testimony, the man who accosted her pulled her behind
a hill, disarranged her clothing and put his fingers in, and
on, her private parts. She also complained that he exhibited
his own sexual organs and attempted to force her to commit an unnatural act. She testified that he then, drew a knife,
telling her that she was to walk · away and not look back or
he would kill her. According to her story, the entire encounter took place in about five minutes. After leaving her
assailant, the witness walked to a corner store where she
first called the police who noted the time as 6:06 p. m. and
then, a few minutes l~ter, called her mother.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT

Three days after the commission of the crime, the complaining witness was shown a picture of the defendant. This
picture was on the top of a pile of pictures. She remembered
having seen him some time prior to the day in question but
was unable to remember where, or ~hen, she had seen him.
She admitted that she could have seen him almost any place.
An hour after having been shown the defendant's picture,
she was taken to a room wliere the defendant was alone. She
testified that at the time of the offense her assailant was
wearing tan khaki pants with a zipper fly, a belt with the
initial "W" on the buckle, and a yellow cable knit sweater
with short sleeves. So far as the defendant's physical appearance was concerned, she testified that he was 5'11" tall,
weighed 187 pounds, and was 21 years of age. On cross-
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examination she said he could not have been 5'10" tall, or
6'0" tall, but was 5'11". (The defendant is 5'11" in height,
21 years of age, and, at the time of arrest, weighed 185
pounds.) The complaining witness testi£ed that the man
who accosted her had "goo on his hair, you know, slicked
down.'' The record shows that the defendant owned khaki
pants with a button fly, a yellow T shirt, a plain tan belt
with no initial on the buckle ; that he did not own, or have
any reason to own, a buckle with the initial "W" thereon;
that he did own a belt buclP.e with the initials "NMMI"
(New Mexico Military IIl.!ltitute); that he wore no hair oil;
nor did he own any. On the · day in question, the defendant
was wearing, together with khaki trousers and a yellow T
shirt, the plain, uninitialed, web belt. He testi£ed that the
only time he wore the belt with the initials "NMMI" was
when he was dressed up at school. The defendant testi£ed
that the khaki trousers and yellow T shirt was a common
manner of dress in the neighborhood: This is corroborated
by two witnesses who testified that they had each seen a
boy, not the defendant, similarly dressed, at the time of
the crime, in that neighborhood, walking rapidly away from
the park. These other boys were seen at about 6 :10 .and
6:30p.m.
Darlene Hatton, aged 15 years, testified that she had been
swimming in the pool in the park in question, and that shortly
before the time of the offense, the defendant had been outside the wire fence which enclosed the pool, a distance of
approximately 16 feet, and had whistled at her. She testified that the man who whistled at her had slick, shiny hair
"plastered" down, but she did 1;1ot testify as to how he was
dressed. She thought that it was either Thursday or Friday
of the week following the offense (which had taken place
on a Saturday) that the woman who owned a candy concession at the park had shown her the picture of the defendant and asked her if she had ever seen him before. .A few
hours after seeing the one picture-that of defendant-she
was taken to a police line-up where she identified the defendant · as the man whose picture she had seen and who bad
whistled at her the previous Saturday. She, too, testifiPd
that she bad seen the defendant before the day in question
"once or twice" at the Dimond Pool (the one here involved)
but could not remember when she had seen him.
Defendant's brother testified that he and defense counsel,
walking together, met the complaining witness and her mother
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in the courthouse just prior to the commencement of the
trial and the attorney, pointing to defendant's brother, asked
the child if she were still "sure that this is the man who
did it," to which she replied that she was. At the trial the
child denied having said so, but•the mother admitted that the
question had been asked and answered by the child, but said
that the witness, Robert Evans, was not in her line of vision.
The complaining witness admitted having told the story
to police officers and the prosecuting attorney about 10 times.
In describing the attack on her she used the term ''private
parts'' and explained that the police officers had told her
to use it; at the preliminary hearing, she had used the words
"penis" and "vulva" and said at the trial that she had
learned the words in a book her mother had given her but
she didn't remember how long before her mother had given
her the book.
DEFENDANT's

ALmr

Defendant's story, which was corroborated by his grandmother and brother, showed that he had worked around his
home, a distance of about nine or ten blocks from the park,
until approximately 5 :30 p. m. on that Saturday; that he
then drove to the store for some groceries and there cashed
a check; that he returned home at about 5 :55 p. m. and was
at dinner until 6 :30 p. m. One of the employees of the grocery store corroborated the defendant's story that the check
was cashed on the Saturday in question but did not know
at what time it had been done. Defendant testified that he
had been in school in New Mexico up until the first of June,
1950, and that he had remained at home from that time on.
He testified that he had been in Dimond Park two or three
times since his return from school; that he had not been
there on the day in question; that be had been there within
two or three weeks prior to .August 12th.
PREJUDICIAL ERRORS AND MiscONDUCT OccURRING AT THE TRIAL

Three days after the crime was committed, defendant, at
the telephoned request of the police, went to the police station. He testified that at the time of the call be bad been
working on his radio with a small 2-inch pocket knife which
he put in his pocket when he left home; that when he arrived at the station, he remembered he had it with him and
being afraid of having it found on his person since he did
not know with what he was charged and having heard the
officers mention a knife, he stuck it under the arch of his
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shoe with the open blade inserted in the heel. The knife
was found there by the officers who searched him. It was
later returned to him and was never put in evidence by the
prosecution although a witness was called to testify to the
incident and it was referred to as being of the same type
and description as that carried by the man who attacked
the complaining witness, although no evidence was offered
either describing the knife carried by him or which would
indicate that the one found on defendant's person was in
any way connected with the attack. The knife was referred
to in both the opening statement of the prosecution and in
its closing argument as being the same type of knife carried by the girl's attacker. The girl herself was unable to
describe the knife.
In addition to references to the knife, one of the witnesses,
Dagneau, was questioned as follows: "Well now, at the time
that the police officers received the information from you
as to having seen this man at approximately 6 :05, or thereabouts, they asked you whether or not he was about twenty
years old, tall and very strong looking ; brown hair, brown
eyes, dark hair on his forearms, freckles on his face, brown
shoes, sun tan pants and a yellow shirt, age about 20 or 21,
height about five feet eleven, weight 185.'' This was the
exact description of the defendant who was sitting in the
courtroom. There had been no direct evidence as to the
freckles, dark hair OJ;l the forearms, color of the eyes, etc.
The witness was then asked if this was the description of
the man the police were seeking, to which he answered "Yes."
The entire description was repeated a few questions later,
and could only have had the effect of informing the jury
that the police ~ere looking for the defendant, and not for
the girl's attacker, at the time they questioned the witness,
Dagneau. The witness later testified that defendant was not
the man he had seen running from the park although the
man he had seen was wearing a yellow shirt of some type.
Several instances appear in the record where the prosecution asked leading questions apparently for the purpose of
getting uncorroborated testimony before the jury. For example, the defendant, upon being questioned by the police,
had refused to talk until after he had consulted with his
father. Much stress is placed on defendant's refusal to talk
until he had seen his father and one of the officers testified
that when defendant was asked to confess the crime he had
replied that "his father had always told him never to admit
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anything.'' On cross-examination, the prosecutor was permitted to ask defendant, over objection, "Do you remember
that in that same conversation with Genevesino and Brown
(police officers) Genevesino said, 'John, that little girl that
pointed you out last night and said you were in Dimond
Park last Saturday August the 12th around six p. m. and forced
her head down and made her do something to you, had you
seen her prior to that Saturday!' And at that time, you
said, 'Yes, once before, I think.' Now, didn't he ask you
that question and didn't you give that answer Y'' The defendant's answer was that he did not remember any such
conversation. Another example of such questioning by the
prosecution was one asked of the defendant, ''. . . did you
tell Officer Brown in response to his request that you would
tell him the truth about where it occurred on August 12th
in the Dimond Park Y Did you say that you did not want
to ·tell the truth of what happened until you had talked with
your father because your father had told you never to admit
anything Y'' Defenda.Ii.t denied having made any such statement ap.d said that he had already told the officers the truth
''about fifty other times too.'' Another question during defendant's cross-examination was, "Well, did they (the officers) mention the fact that the little girl wh.om you had, seen
had said that you had a knife when you accosted her in the
Dimond Park," to which defendant replied that they "might
have."
Endeavors were also made to elicit' a statement from the
defendant's brother that defense counsel had engaged him
in an attempt to "trick" the complaining witness into identifying him as the defendant. When defense counsel objected,
the court ruled it was proper cross-examination even though
the witness twice answered that defense coUnsel had not so
acted.
[1] In none of the instances above quoted did the prosecution make any attempt to prove the truth of the matters
asserted in the questions. It seems apparent that the only
purpose of the ·form of the questions was to get the statements before the jury. Although objections were not made
to all of these questions, it would appear that the case was
one in which an admonition would not have purged the
harmful effect of the remarks. In cases where the misconduct is of such a character that it cannot be purged of
its harmful effect by an admonition, it will be considered
as a possible ground for reversal where no objection was
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made or admonition requested on behalf of the accused (People v. Wynn, 44 Cal.App.2d 723 [112 P.2d 979]; People v.
Podwys, 6 Cal.App.2d 71 [44 P.2d 377]; People v. Stafford,
108 Cal.App. 26 [290 P. 920]; People v. George, 72 Cal.
App. 124 [236 P. 934]).
THE INFORMATION

[2] The complaint against defendant charged only a violation of section 288 of the Penal Code, and he was bound
over by the committing magistrate only upon that charge.
The information, however, contained additional counts charging a violation of section 288a of the Penal Code and assault
with a deadly weapon. Defendant contends that the court
was without jurisdiction to try him on the 288a count and
that reading the information to the jury must have had a
highly inflammatory effect and amounted to prejudicial error.
He also · contends that because of the inclusion of the violation of section 288a in the information it is void. This matter was recently considered by this court in Parks v. Superior
Court, 38 Cal.2d 609, 612 [241 P.2d 521], wherein it was
said: "In the decisions which outline the duties of the district attorney pursuant to the foregoing provisions of the la:w
[Cal. Const., art. I, § 8, and of the Pen. Code, § 739] there
has been no departure from the proposition that the Constitution protects a person from prosecution in the absence of
a prior determination by either a magistrate or a grand jury
that such action is justified. The legislative history and
various claimed grounds of unconstitutionality of the provisions of former section 809 (now 739) were rather extensively treated in People v. Bird, 212 Cal. 632 [300 P. 23].
The effect of the court's declarations of the constitutional
operation of the section was to approve the :filing of an information charging a different but related crime shown by
the evidence taken before the magistrate bearing on the transaction involved in the commitment order. The court stated
or plainly implied (212 Cal. at pp. 643-645) that an information would be contrary to the Constitution if it designated
a crime or crimes unrelated to or unconnected with the transaction which was the basis for the commitment order." The
Parks case is controlling here inasmuch as the story told by
the complaining witness shows that the two crimes were related to and connected with the transaction which was the
basis for· the commitment order.
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INSTRUCTION oN ''REAsoNABLE DoUBT''

[3] The defendant complains of the following instruction:
''The defendant in a criminal case is not required to prove
his innocence, but is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proven, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal,
and if the evidence can reasonably be accounted for upon
a theory which would admit of a ·defendant's innocence, he
should not be convicted." There can be no question but
that this instruction is inartistically and awkwardly drawn
and, in the absence of any other instruction on the subject,
it would be difficult to tell what its confusing or prejudicial
effect would be. In the instant ·case, however, following the
above quoted instruction, the court told the jury that : "The
effect of a presumption of innocence is only to place upon
the State the burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.'' This was followed by the orthodox
instruction on the meaning of "reasonable doubt."
JURORS l AFFIDAVITS

[4] Two jurors produced affidavits that one of the jury,
other than themselves, had taken a map of the city of Oakland in the jury room during the discussion of the jury.
This map had not been received in evidence during the trial.
The defendant contends that it was error to deny his motion
for a new trial based on this evidence. The court refused
to admit the affidavits in evidence, but ordered th.em filed.
Defendant maintains that the rule declaring affidavits of
jurors incompetent does not apply where they are used to
show that the jury has received evidence out of court (other
than a view of the premises) and that this is mentioned as
a separate ground for granting a new trial in subdivision
2 of section 1181 of the Penal Code.
There is no merit in this contention since the affidavits are
introduced to impeach the verdict of the jury whether they
show misconduct or evidence received out of court. In People v. Gidney, 10 ·cal.2d 138, 146 [73 P.2d 1186], it was
expressly held that affidavits of jurors showing misconduct
out of court ''or evidence received by them from outside
sources'' have been refused admission.
[5a] This case presents an extremely close question as to
the identity of the defendant. The child's testimony describing her assailant with such exactitude raises a doubt
as to whether or not she had been coached in her lines.
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When this "suspect" testimony is considered with the improper line of questioning on the part of the prosecution it
may very well have led the jury to its conclusion that the
defendant was guilty. Several times during the trial, the
jury heard the prosecution describe the precise appearance
of the defendant as he sat in the courtroom; it heard the
words of police officers describing a particularly vile crime
put in the form of questions to defendant in an attempt to
gain from him an admission. The repetitious questions setting forth defendant's exact description could have had no
other effect upon the jurors than to impress indelibly upon
their minds the fact that the police had been looking for the
defendant, not the unknown and unidentified man who molested the complaining witness. The statements made, in the
guise of questions directed to defendant, in an effort to gain
from him an admission could only have had one result,
namely, that the jury would believe defendant had admitted
the crime to the officers and was, on the trial, denying the
truth of what he had previously said.
[6] The repeated asking of questions relative to objectionable and prejudicial matter which involved appeals to the
passions and prejudices of the jury has been held to constitute reversible error. (People v. Freitas, 34 Cal.A.pp.2d 684
[94 P.2d 397] ; People v. Duvernay, 43 Cal.A.pp.2d 823 [111
P.2d 659]; People v. Wynn, 44 Cal.App.2d 723 [112 P.2d
9?9]; People v. Lynch, 60 Cal.A.pp.2d 133 [140 P.2d 418];
People v. Williarn.s, 104 Cal.A.pp.2d 323 [231 P.2d 544] .)
[5b] The same thi:qg is true with respect to the references
to the knife made by the prosecution. The knife found on
defendant's person by the police was not in evidence and the
complaining witness had been unable to describe the knife
used by her assailant, yet the district attorney referred to
defendant's knife as being the same type of knife carried
by the girl's attacker. [7] Statements of facts not in evidence
by the prosecution in its argument to the jury has been held
to constitute prejudicial misconduct. (People v. Ford, 89 Cal.
A.pp.2d 467 [200 P.2d 867] ; People v. Westcott, 86 Cal.A.pp.
298 [260 P. 901]; People v. Henderson, 4 Cal.2d 188 [48
P.2d 17]; People v. Cook, 148 Cal. 334 [83 P. 43].)
In a case such as this where the crime charged is of
itself sufficient to inflame the mind of the average person, it
is required that there be rigorous insistence upon observance
of the rules of the admission of evidence and conduct of the
trial. (People v. Adarn.s, 14 Cal.2d 154, 167 [93 P.2d 146] ; •
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People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 888 [129 P .2d 367] ;
People v. Byrd, 88 Cal.App.2d 188, 190 [198 P.2d 561] ).
It appears to us that even more care should be taken to protect the rights of the accused where the evidence as to the
identity of the defendant leads one to conclude that a child
of the age of . the complaining witness, under the circumstance prevailing, would not have been able to describe her
attacker so precisely. As was said in People v. Adams, supra:
"Errors committed either by the prosecution or by the court
in the course of a trial, which ordinarily might be considered
trivial and as of no material consequence from a standpoint
of adverse effect upon the rights of a defendant, may become
of great importance when committed in a case of the character here involved."
[5c] The only evidence presented as to the identity of
the girl's assailant is the testimony of the complaining witness. While her testimony is not so inherently improbable
as to be worthy of no belief, it is open to attack on the
ground that it shows that she had been suggestively questioned and re-questioned as to the crime by the police. In
connection therewith, it can hardly be said to be in accord
with principles of justice and fair play to show a complaining witness the picture of one man and then take her into
a room where that man is the only occupant.
It must be concluded that where, as here, the case is one
involving a crime of such an inflammatory character and
the evidence on the issue of identity so closely balanced, the
errors set forth could not have had any other effect upon
the jury than to tip the scales against the accused.
The order denying a new trial is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J.,
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August
7, 1952.

